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Bounded Rationality 
The Adaptive Toolbox 
by Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard 
Selten (Editors)  
MIT Press, 2001 
Review by Adriano Palma, Ph.D. on 
Apr 22nd 2004 
Even intuitively standard descriptions of what 
rational behavior consists of face strange difficulties. I 
cite two instances. It is fairly common to think that 
rational action entails some element of choice. Nobody 
is rational in breathing, since nobody decides to breath. 
Choosing seems to entail a range >1 of potential 
outcomes. One is supposed to survey mentally, as it 
were, the field of available choices. Secondly to (try to) 
assess their foreseen or foreseeable consequences. 
Thirdly establish a hierarchy by means of a matching 
procedures between outcomes and one's own prior 
preferences.  
A weird remark: much of our mental life (where 
"we" comprises many humans in leisure societies) is 
spent in finding out what to do at all, not really in 
assessing means to ends. Often we do not know what 
our ends are. This is however an external problem: we 
do not really know in which sense people have 
preferences and why they have those they do have. 
Note that in any event there is always an element of 
choice, albeit a non conscious one. Lifetime is a scarce 
commodity and doing "nothing" is a choice after all on 
the allocation of such a commodity. The issue of what 
forms, if anything, preferences is best left to some other 
occasion. 
Closer to the issues in the text under review is a 
second almost paradoxical aspect of rationality thus 
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conceived. The elementary scheme above entails that 
one has to make hard choices. It may very well be the 
alternatives that come to mind are not exhaustive. In 
principle they are never exhausting physical, let alone 
logical, possibilities. What tells me that the set of 
alternatives I consider is the good one? One may very 
well concoct an infinity of situations in which the only 
"rational" thing to do is keep searching for more and/or 
better alternatives. But notice that this process itself is 
time/energy consuming hence it is a choice in 
allocating my one and only lifetime. This is in a 
semitechnical language known as a stopping problem. 
And it leads to a vicious circularity: one has to perform 
the very same task to know when it is bet to keep 
looking and when it is best to stop looking and make do 
with what one can come up with. And this entails 
another search and so forth. The standpoint taken by 
this collection is partly derived from the "satisficing" 
approach advocated by one of the founders of modern 
behavioral science, H. Simon. When a subject satisfices 
she stop searching at any time an alternative is found 
that is as high or better than a pre-fixed aspiration level. 
One of the editors (Reinhard Selten) has improved this 
approach. 
The general idea of the collection is to explore 
an adaptive toolbox (yet another mental box for the 
cognitively inclined.) The box contains heuristics: 
methods that can deliver choices within strict 
boundaries and that are, on the face of it, fairly 
irrational in an intuitive sense. Why should I believe 
that the best stock to pick in trading session in the 
stockmarket is the one whose name I recognise? The 
present collection provides some evidence and some 
answers.  
The adaptive toolbox is supposed to be shaped 
at once by internal constraints and by environmental 
pressures. The constraints are fairly easy to recognize: 
no (human) agent has infinite memory or computing 
power to actually solve optimization problems by brute 
force. The environmental pressure is a subtler 
contribution of Gigerenzer et al.'s approach. A strategy 
within the toolbox may match in structural properties 
an environment (p. 46) and may be robust in being able 
to generalize well. The main idea behind the research 
program is to look at the evidence we have that could 
explain our reliance on heuristics. And many of the 
papers here do provide experimental evidence. To the 
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mind of this reader two questions stand out here. It is 
fairly clear that we do adopt heuristics, fast and frugal, 
the simplest probably is based on mimicry. It is also 
fairly clear that we can adopt more traditional methods. 
The evidence and theory here displayed is impressive. 
In Goldstein et al. (Ch. 10) the question comes to the 
fore. "Which homunculus selects among heuristics, or 
there is none?" (p. 188). My own question is: how do 
we select between the frugal adaptive toolbox and the 
more cumbersome and austere traditional "optimizing" 
model? It is my opinion that we do not have a proof yet 
that only heuristics are used in decision making.  
On the critical side, the book turns out to be 
very uneven. Possibly this is not avoidable in a 
collection that reports a variety of approaches (from 
cultural anthropology to algorithm theory) and research 
in progress. The most interesting part, for the 
psychologically minded are probably those that deal 
with emotions (see in particular ch. 15.)  
But the absolutely most fascinating section 
deals with an extremely clearheaded treatment of a 
problem that may baffle us. We often conceive of 
organisms as single individuals (Adriano chooses to 
write an article and Christian decides whether to 
publish it or not.) Nature in its weird wisdom appear to 
display a different kind of choice-making apparatus. 
Consider that swarms of bees have to decide where to 
place their next colony once they have to move out of 
one home site. T. D. Seeley (ch. 15) produces an 
extremely beautiful account of the fact that completely 
idiotic single-bee-level mechanisms (and not well 
understood ones, see p. 260) crank out decisions 
followed by the entire swarm. Alternatives are 
evaluated, though each bee scout visits one and only 
one site, by having all of them dance to signal 
locations. The mechanism of the debate is somewhat 
unclear (see p. 258 on comparative vs. noncomparative 
tactics); but evidence appears to point in the direction 
of the "loser" bees dropping out of the debate far more 
than by "persuading" anybody or anything of the 
superiority of their finds. The key conceptual point here 
is a super-organism (the swarm) may reach a decision 
(and an effective one at that – bees consistently pick 
better nests in experimental settings) without having 
any central authority and any particularly clever single-
organism member.  
The implication for human decision making 
may be stark to be stared in the face. We decide 
nothing at all, we are assemblies of bee-like 
mechanisms, some fast and frugal heuristics, some 
dumb and cumbersome rationalistic -Leibnitzian 
computers. The consequences on the ethics and 
deontology of the way we treat ourselves and even our 
own psychopathologies may be immense. 
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